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Well-Being in England
   
Abstract 
   
While much is known regarding the effects of immigration for objective outcomes, relatively little is 
known regarding effects for perceived well-being. By exploiting spatial and temporal variation in the 
net-inflows of foreign-born individuals across local areas in England, we examine the relationship 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ 嬀 ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ǁĞůů-being as captured by the General Health
Questionnaire (GHQ). We find small negative effects overall but that an analysis of main effects masks 
significant differences across sub-groups with relatively older individuals, those with below average 
household incomes, the unemployed and finally those without any formal educational qualifications 
experiencing much more substantive well-being losses than others. These observed well-being 
differentials are congruent with voting patterns evident in the recent UK referendum on EU 
membership. We put forward perceived as opposed to actual labour market competition and social 
identity as two potential explanations for the negative well-being impacts of immigration for natives. 
Keywords: Immigration; mental health; social-identity; subjective well-being; labour market 
competition 
3 
Introduction 
Following the 2004 enlargement of the European Union, the UK experienced a large influx of migrants 
from new EU member states (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and 
Slovenia  W also known as the accession or A8 countries).  The effect of this influx of new migrants on 
the UK economy has been the subject of intense political debate, and was one of the dominant issues 
in the recent UK referendum on EU membership. Yet much of the research that has been done in the 
UK suggests that immigration has had little, if any, negative impact on the labour market outcomes of 
natives and this finding is mirrored in much of the research outside the UK (Card, 2005; Dustmann et 
al., 2013; Lemos and Portes, 2013) 
In public discourse, immigration is also often associated with increased burdens on taxpayers through 
rising health care costs and demand for social services. Again, the available evidence suggests that 
migrants are typically younger and healthier, and in turn more likely to be at work (hence less likely to 
access social services) than the native UK population. In effect, it is likely that they not only pay their 
own way, but also partly subsidise the costs of public services for others (Dustmann et al., 2010). Such 
findings, coupled with increasing worries over immigration expressed by many during the recent EU 
referendum campaign in the UK, as well as the rise of far-right populist parties with an anti-
immigration stance throughout Europe, leads us to question if there are other pathways by which 
inflows of migrants affects the well-being of natives. Within this context, rather than focusing on 
economic outcomes such as labour market impacts, the main aim of this work is to examine the impact 
of immigration on the subjective well-being of natives.  
Considering the population as a whole (main effects), we find using both a fixed-effects (following the 
same individuals over time) and instrumental variable specification (quasi-natural experiment) that 
net inflows of foreign-born individuals into local areas are associated with negative (albeit relatively 
small) subjective well-being impacts for natives. These negative impacts are much more substantive, 
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however, for certain groups such as relatively older individuals (60+), the unemployed, those with 
below average household incomes and finally those without any formal educational qualifications. On 
the other hand, the subjective well-being of non-UK born natives appears to be enhanced by inflows 
of migrants. We put forward perceived as opposed to actual labour market competition and social 
identity as two of the factors underpinning these results.  
 
Previous research relating to the relationship between immigration and subjective well-being 
While there is a rich literature investigating the impact of immigration on objective measures of well-
being such as labour market outcomes, research examining the relationship between immigration and 
subjective indicators of well-being is relatively sparse.  The studies in this area most closely related to 
our own work are Akay et al. (2014; 2017) and Ivlevs and Veliziotis (2018) both of which examined the 
relationship between immigration and self-reported life satisfaction. In what is perhaps the first study 
in this area using panel-data methods, Akay et al. (2014) and Akay et al. (2017) in influential work in 
Germany, found using the German Socio-economic Panel a positive relationship between both 
immigration and ethnic diversity with the life satisfaction of natives. These effects were largely driven 
by the relatively younger age-cohorts as they found no significant relationship for those over 50. Given 
that the composition, rate of change as well as attitudes towards migrants may differ, the relationship 
between immigration and well-being may, however, be different in the UK than that observed in 
Germany (see Giuletti, 2017).  
 
Bearing this in mind, if we look at research in the UK, it is interesting to observe that Ivlevs and 
Veliziotis (2018) employed a similar methodology to that of Akay et al (2014; 2017), but observed no 
significant main effect when it comes to the relationship between inflows of people from the A8 
accession countries1 and the life satisfaction of natives.  A different picture did emerge, however, 
when they looked specifically at various sub-groups. Here they find some evidence to suggest that 
increases in the A8 migration inflow rate is negatively associated with the life satisfaction of relatively 
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older, lower-income, and unemployed individuals, but positively related with the life satisfaction of 
their younger and wealthier counterparts.  
The main objective of this research is also to examine the relationship between immigration and 
subjective well-being.  We follow a similar strategy to that employed by Ivlevs and Veliziotis (2018) in 
the UK and also that by Akay et al. (2014; 2017) in Germany, but with some key differences.  First, by 
concentrating on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), Ivlevs and Veliziotis (2018) were 
constrained to a relatively short time period, namely 2003 W2008 (immediately before and after the 
2004 EU enlargement), and as such it is possible that their estimates capture the effect of an initial 
migration shock due to the A8 accession. By merging the BHPS with the UK Household Longitudinal 
Survey (UKHLS) our work is based on a much larger sample period ranging from 2000 to 2017.  
A further key difference between our own work and that of existing research relates to our 
identification strategy. Specifically, we adopt two different estimators (panel models with individual 
fixed-effects and an instrumental variable approach) as well as a battery of sensitivity tests to address 
any remaining concerns surrounding, for example, residential sorting. In the first case, the effect of 
immigration in our main fixed-effects model of subjective well-being is identified only when it changes 
for the same individual, and after controlling for a rich set of time-varying factors at both the 
individual, neighbourhood and national level. In the second case, we instrument our measure relating 
to numbers of foreign-born individuals living in local areas with an exogenous predicted value based 
on prior settlement patterns. The combination of these approaches will help account for any 
endogeneity issues that may have been a factor in previous work.  
Finally, we estimate the effect of net inflows of foreign-born individuals (migrants) on subjective well-
being as captured by the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) as opposed to self-reported life 
satisfaction.  The original General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) measure was initially conceived as a 
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screening instrument for psychiatric disorders (e.g. see Goldberg and Hillier, 1979), but the version 
used in this study consists of a shorter 12 item scale and is commonly used as a general measure 
of subjective well-being.  The main advantage of the GHQ as is that it is based on responses to 12 
separate questions as opposed to one singular measure of life satisfaction. 
 
Why would immigration affect perceived well-being? 
We put forward two potential factors, namely economic self-interest and social identity to explain 
why immigration may have subjective well-being consequences for natives. When it comes to 
economic self-interest, there is a rich economic literature concerned with establishing the effects of 
inflows of migrants for labour market outcomes. Intuitively, one can imagine that inflows of migrants 
may be a source of competition for natives (especially lower-skilled workers) thus lowering wages and 
lessening employment opportunities.  Despite the intuitive appeal of this line of argument, empirical 
evidence on the whole would suggest that immigration is associated with little if any2 changes in wages 
(e.g. see Card, 2005; Dustmann et al., 2013; Lemos and Portes, 2013).  
 
In public discourse, it is also commonly argued that immigration is a drain on public finances. The 
available evidence would suggest, however, that migrants make a substantive net positive fiscal 
contribution overall (Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). While there is a lack of clear evidence relating to 
a negative effect for either labour market outcomes or public finances, natives themselves may still 
feel that inflows of migrants lessens their employment opportunities or increases their taxes due to, 
for example, social welfare spending. Thus inflows of migrants could be a source of psychological 
distress for natives based on the belief that it lowers their economic opportunities.  Two issues 
highlighted recently in this journal which might help fuel this belief is that migrant workers are more 
likely to be over-qualified for their job (Sirkeci et al., 2018) and have lower absence from work rates, 
at least in the short run (Dawson et al., 2018). 
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Social identity theory offers another platform for explaining why immigration may affect native well-
being. Social identity theory developed from the early work of Tajfel (1974), in order to explain 
intergroup behaviour. The theory postulates that groups to which people belong (e.g. country of birth) 
can be an important source of pride and self-esteem, thus fostering psychological well-being (Haslam 
et al., 2009). The central hypothesis behind this theory is that in order to increase their own self-image, 
people will often boost the status of (and sense of belonging to) their own ingroup, in order to 
discriminate against a contrasting outgroup to which they do not belong. Examples of group 
membership include: fandom of a sports team, local community, or what is of relevance for this study, 
nation state.   
 
In keeping with this theory, native individuals who strongly identify with characteristics that define 
others in their native ingroup such as ethnic background may be relatively more likely to perceive 
migrants as belonging to an outgroup.  People engage in social comparisons and think more positively 
of the ingroup (other natives) and more negatively of the out-group (immigrants). This can lead to a 
favourability gap between their ingroup whom they find to be esteemed, thereby creating a positive 
identity, and a disliked outgroup who they may see as being less trustworthy (Mangum and Block, 
2018). Inflows of migrants can, in turn, act to destabilise the social identity and subsequently well-
being of ingroup natives, because it may threaten the boundaries between ingroup and outgroup via 
the process of acculturation (see van der Zee et al., 2016). It has been suggested, for instance, that 
ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƚŽĂƐƐŝŵŝůĂƚĞ ?ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞ ?Ğ ?Ő ?ĚƵĞƚŽƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ŽƌƐŚŝĨƚŝŶŐƐŽĐŝĂůŶŽƌŵƐ ?ĂŶĚŐŝǀĞƵƉŽŶĞ ?ƐƐĞŶƐĞ
of ethnic identity may result in anger, depression, or even violence (Phinney, et al., 2001).  
 
Building on the discussion above, we hypothesise that both perceived economic impacts and social 
identity will play a role in predicting the degree to which natives are impacted, in subjective well-being 
terms, by inflows of migrants. As a way to test our idea relating to perceived economic impacts, we 
examine if changes in GDP moderates the subjective well-being effects associated with inflows of 
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migrants. Our rationale being that natives are more likely to perceive migrants as an economic threat 
when economic conditions are relatively less favourable.  In relation to social identity, we hypothesise 
that on the basis of cultural similarities, non-UK born residents will be relatively less likely to perceive 
ŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨĂŶ ?ŽƵƚŐƌŽƵƉ ?ƚŚĂŶUK born ones. In turn, if inflows of migrants negatively impacts 
the subjective well-being of natives, our a priori expectation is that these effects will be more apparent 
for UK as opposed to non-UK born residents.  
 
Methods 
Our study uses information from two longitudinal British surveys, namely the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) and its successor, the UK Household Longitudinal Survey (UKHLS). These surveys collect, 
ŽŶĂŶĂŶŶƵĂůďĂƐŝƐ ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞǁĞůů-being, together with numerous 
other individual characteristics. We restrict our analysis to the period 2000 until 2017, as the year 
2000 was the earliest date in which we have annual data relating to numbers of foreign-born 
individuals living in local authority areas in England. 
 
Outcome Variables 
The indicator of subjective well-being we use as our key outcome variable is the General Health 
Questionnaire (GHQ) which consists of a 12 item scale (see Table A1 in the appendix). Each item is 
accompanied by four possible responses: two of the answers are positive and two are negative. A 
score ranging from 0 (best) to 36 (worst) is computed for each individual in the survey  W the higher 
the score then the more likely it is that respondents are suffering from some form of psychological 
distress. For simplicity, we reorder this variable so that individuals are scored from 0 (worst) to 36 
(best), and label this variable as subjective well-being.   
 
Measure of inflows of foreign-born individuals (migrants)  
Through a special license application, we obtained a geographic identifier pertaining to which local 
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authority area each individual in our household surveys belongs (BHPS and UKHLS). Using this 
geographic identifier, we spatially linked our longitudinal household survey datasets recording 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? subjective well-being with information from the Office for National Statistics (ONS), 
relating to estimated numbers of foreign-born individuals living in their local authority area. There are 
391 local authorities in the UK. The ONS bases these estimates on the UK Annual Population Survey 
which is the largest survey in the UK consisting of 320,000 respondents (see Figure A1 in the appendix 
for a visual illustration of how numbers of migrants have changed over time). Like our household 
surveys recording individual well-being, this information from the ONS is available on an annual basis. 
The end result of this data linkage is that we can relate changes in indivŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞǁĞůů-being 
as captured by the GHQ, to changes in the numbers of foreign-born individuals living in their local 
area.  
 
Key controls 
We merged our household survey datasets with the English Indices of Multiple Deprivation provided 
by the Department for Communities and Local Government. These Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation allow us to control for any differences in economic and social deprivation across 
neighbourhoods (see A2 in the Appendix for more details). We supplemented this measure with 
region dummies.3 A detailed set of individual controls were also included in the analysis (see Table A3 
in the appendix for relevant summary statistics). Additionally, in order to control for any macro and 
period-specific changes, we added in wave dummies4 and a measure of annual GDP growth. Lastly, to 
account for any potential heteroscedasticity or serial correlation, we used cluster robust standard 
errors (clustered at the individual level).5 
 
Empirical Specification 
The analysis begins by assuming that subjective well-being of individual i living in local authority l at 
time t (Wilt) is explained by a vector of socio-economic and demographic characteristics (Xit) (including 
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labour force status), neighbourhood deprivation (NDlt), annual GDP growth at the national level (GDPt) 
and changes in the number of foreign-born individuals living in each local authority area (FBlt). This 
yields the following explanatory model where ai is the individual fixed effect and v and r are a set of 
wave and region dummies: 
௜ܹ௟௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଶܰܦ௟௧ ൅ ߚଷܩܦ ௧ܲ ൅ ߚସܨܤ௟௧൅ܽ௜ ൅ ݒ௧ ൅ ݎ ൅ ߝ௜௟௧    (1) 
The aim of this fixed-effects analysis is to give us an initial understanding of the impact of changes in 
the number of foreign-born individuals living in each local authority area on the subjective well-being 
of natives living in the host communities. Here we define natives as individuals born in the UK. Later 
we also examine to what extent inflows of foreign-born individuals affect the subjective well-being of 
non-UK born residents.  
 
It is worth noting that our use of fixed-effects will account for any unobserved heterogeneity that is 
time-invariant at the individual level. Macroeconomic conditions are accounted for by including 
annual GDP growth; other general trends and factors common to our sample of respondents are also 
captured by our wave dummies (v). Furthermore, we control for a wide array of both individual level 
controls, and neighbourhood deprivation, which helps us account for any time-variant sources of 
heterogeneity at the individual or local level.  Still it is possible that our regression estimates may still 
affected to some degree by endogeneity issues such as measurement error as the ONS data relating 
to numbers of foreign-born individuals in each local authority area are estimates based on annual 
population surveys, albeit these are large-scale surveys and so any measurement error is likely to be 
small. 
 
One mechanism to account for any remaining endogeneity issues would be to adopt an instrumental 
variable approach and in this study we rely on an instrumental variable strategy based on past 
settlement patterns first developed by Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001) (see A4 in the 
appendix for more details). The idea behind this instrument is that independent of any differences in 
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economic opportunities, migrants will be more attracted to certain areas over others based on the 
settlement patterns of past migrants. Thus prior settlement patterns will help predict future inflows 
and this predicted value, in turn, will serve as a suitable instrumental variable for actual current inflows 
of foreign-born individuals into local areas. 
 
To implement this approach in our study, first we obtain data relating to the concentration of migrants 
in each local authority area from the 2001 and 2011 Censuses. Next we use this information to obtain 
ƚŚĞ ?ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚ ?numbers of foreign-born individuals in each local authority area to use as an instrument 
for the actual number. The predicted number is simply obtained by redistributing the total numbers 
of migrants, based on the prior settlement patterns evident from past censuses (see A4 in the 
appendix for more details in relation to the derivation of this instrumental variable). 
 
Results 
Main effects  
Table 1 presents the main effect estimates relating to the impact of immigration on the subjective 
well-being of natives in England.6 The results relating to our control variables are all along expected 
lines (see Dolan et al. 2008) and are reported in Table A5 in the Appendix and so for parsimony are 
not discussed. The first specification outlines the results from a pooled cross-sectional model, whereas 
in the second column we take advantage of the panel nature of the dataset by employing individual 
fixed-effects. We label our key explanatory variable of interest as foreign-born individuals (measured 
in ten thousands). This variable captures the relationship between changes in the numbers of people 
born outside the UK living within each local authority area (net inflows of migrants), and the subjective 
well-being of natives (UK-born individuals) already living in those areas. Our specifications include a 
full set of individual characteristics (including labour force status), national GDP, wave and region 
dummies and a neighbourhood deprivation rank.  
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In our pooled cross-sectional model, foreign-born individuals attracted a positive coefficient (0.003) 
but one that was close to zero and not statistically significant. For specification two, where we took 
advantage of the longitudinal nature of our datasets by employing individual fixed-effects, foreign-
born individuals attracted a negative and statistically significant coefficient (-0.025, p=0.054). One 
potential explanation for the difference between our pooled cross-sectional and fixed-effects 
specifications is that immigrants are relatively more likely to locate in prosperous areas, and these 
differences are absorbed by the fixed-effects, but not adequately controlled for in the pooled cross-
sectional analysis.  
 
In our fixed-effects specification, the effect of foreign-born individuals on subjective well-being is 
identified only when it changes for the same individual, and after controlling for a rich set of time-
varying factors at both the individual and the neighbourhood level.  Therefore any potential problems 
relating to selection bias is substantially mitigated. That being said, the interested reader is referred 
to Appendix A6 where we discuss the issue of selection bias in more detail and conduct a series of 
robustness checks to further rule out the possibility that our coefficient estimates are significantly 
affected by this issue. In short we tested the sensitivity of our main estimates to additional 
specifications where we added in an additional covariate to capture individuals who moved 
neighbourhoods and second simply excluded all individuals who moved neighbourhoods during our 
study period. We also provide some evidence to suggest that immigration is unlikely to be an 
important factor in the residential choices of natives.  
Insert table 1 here 
Differences across sub-groups 
As illustrated in Table 2, the impact of foreign-born individuals varies substantively across different 
sections of the population.7  First looking at age, we found that the estimated effect of foreign-born 
individuals for those over 60 years of age was just over three times as large as the estimated impact 
when looking at the population as a whole (-0.084, p = 0.008).8 A similar picture emerges when we 
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just focused on the over 70s, only this time foreign-born individuals attracted a coefficient that was 
almost six times as large (-0.142, p = 0.002).  
 
There also appears to be some significant differences across income groups. When looking at 
individuals in the lowest quartile of the household income distribution, foreign-born individuals was 
associated with a negative and statistically significant coefficient (-0.062, p = 0.061) and one that was 
two and a half times that observed when looking at the population as a whole9. The estimated 
coefficient for individuals with below median household income was also negative and statistically 
significant, but smaller (-0.040, p = 0.077) than that observable when looking at those in the lowest 
quartile. All this suggests that the population-level effects outlined in Table 1 masks significant age 
and income group heterogeneity in the relationship between immigration and subjective well-being.   
 
Next we examined if there were any differences across education groups. Foreign-born individuals 
attracted a negative and statistically significant coefficient (-0.138, p = 0.001) for the group of 
individuals without a formal educational qualification (degree or higher is the reference category) and 
one that was approximately five times as large as that observed for the population as a whole. The 
other education groups attracted coefficients that were much smaller in size and not statistically 
significant. Table 2 also presents a comparison between those in full time employment and the 
unemployed. When we just focused on those in full time employment, the observed relationship 
between foreign-born individuals and subjective well-being was negative but not statistically 
significant. On the other hand, when we restricted our analysis to the unemployed, foreign-born 
individuals attracted a negative and statistically significant coefficient (-0.146, p = 0.067) and one that 
was almost six times as large as that observed when looking at the population at a whole.10 Finally, we 
found no significant gender differences in the relationship between foreign-born individuals and 
subjective well-being.  
Insert table 2 here 
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Communicating effect sizes 
The analysis in the preceding section suggests that for certain sub-groups of the population, rising 
numbers of foreign-born individuals living in local areas has had a detrimental impact on subjective 
well-being. The question remains how large are these effects? For illustrative purposes, we compared 
estimated effect sizes to that of other commonly observed negative correlates with subjective well-
being, namely divorce and unemployment. We emphasise, however, that the following interpretation 
needs to be taken cautiously as it is hard to compare effect sizes of personal characteristics with a 
contextual variable such as the number of foreign-born individuals living within a local authority area. 
We can see in the second column of Table A5 in the Appendix that being divorced, as opposed to being 
single, was associated with a -0.396 unit reduction in subjective well-being, whereas unemployment 
as compared to paid employment was associated with a -1.677 unit reduction. This is in keeping with 
much previous research which suggests that unemployment alongside disability is associated with the 
largest reductions in subjective well-being (for further insight on labour market statuses and well-
being, see, <ĂŵĞƌĈĚĞ and Bennett, 2018; Nordenmark, 1999; Strandh, 2000), whereas the adverse 
well-being effects associated with divorce while still significant and substantive is typically more 
modest.  
 
In the year 2000, the mean number of foreign-born individuals living in local authority areas for 
respondents in our sample came to 15,689, whereas in 2016 the mean number had increased to 
42,606. We used this mean level change (26,917) as a reference point, and found that such a change 
translated into an average well-being loss of -0.07 units (2.6917*-0.025) for natives. This is equivalent 
to 18 and 4 percent of the estimated well-being losses from divorce and unemployment for the 
population as a whole. This would suggest that, for the population as a whole, the impact of 
immigration for subjective well-being is relatively weak. The impact, however, of immigration is much 
more notable for certain cohorts. Looking at the over 60s, for instance, we found that such a change 
would be equivalent to 58 and 14 percent, whereas for the over 70s the estimated well-being losses 
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were found to be broadly equivalent to the estimated well-being losses from divorce for the 
population as a whole (96%) and 23 percent of the estimated well-being effects from unemployment. 
It is worth noting at this stage that an increase of 26,917 in the number of foreign-born individuals in 
a local authority area is by no means an extreme scenario, as 30% percent of the current UK population 
live in a local authority area which has experienced a change in excess of this during the study period.  
 
After restricting our analysis to those in the lowest quartile of household income, we found that the 
estimated well-being losses came to 43 and 10 percent of the estimated well-being losses from divorce 
and unemployment respectively for the population as a whole. For the unemployed, the estimated 
effects are somewhat larger (-0.39 unit reduction) which is equivalent to 99 and 23 percent of the 
estimated impact of divorce and unemployment. Taken as a whole, the figures above suggest that the 
overall well-being impact of immigration is relatively small but that there are more notable well-being 
effects for certain sub-groups, namely older, poorer, unemployed and relatively less well-educated 
individuals.  
 
Robustness checks 
Instrumental variable analysis 
To address any concern that our fixed-effects estimates are affected by remaining endogeneity issues 
we instrumented foreign-born individuals with an exogenous predicted value based on prior 
settlement patterns. Specification 3 in Table 1 presents the results from this instrumental variable 
analysis.11 The coefficient for foreign-born individuals is negative, statistically significant and is very 
similar to that obtained in our fixed-effects specification (-0.032 v -0.025). Next we re-ran our sub-
group analysis outlined in Table 2 using our instrumental variable (IV) specification. The point 
estimates are somewhat larger than that observed in the fixed-effects analysis but notwithstanding 
this point, the estimates across both our fixed-effects and instrumental variable specifications are as 
a whole remarkably similar. As a further robustness check, instead of obtaining a predicted value 
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based on prior settlement patterns evident from using both the 2001 and 2011 census, we just used 
the 2001 census. Again we found that the estimates were remarkably similar across both specifications 
(see Table A7 in the appendix for a direct comparison between the different IVs).   
 
Additionally, we repeated the IV analysis, but this time just focused on observations from the UKHLS 
during the 2010-2017 period and again used the 2001 census as the basis for deriving our instrumental 
variable (predicted migrants value). The advantage of this approach is that it allows a minimum of 9 
years but rising to 16 year time gap between the data used to generate our predicted value and actual 
inflows of migrants. Using this approach lessens the possibility that our instrument is significantly 
correlated with unobserved persistent local conditions. We found no significant difference between 
our IV estimates when we restricted the analysis to the 2010-2017 period (-0.032 v -0.035).12 
 
Sensitivity checks 
As a sensitivity check, instead of using aggregate numbers of foreign-born individuals (net inflows) as 
our key explanatory variable, we also used migrant share. Migrant share was simply derived by 
dividing the total numbers of foreign-born individuals by the total population in each local authority 
area.13 In Table 2 we can see that our results when using migrant share as our key explanatory variable 
followed the same general pattern as that observed when using foreign-born individuals both in terms 
of overall population level effects and our sub-group analysis.  
 
What can explain these results? 
Perceived labour market competition 
Our sub group analysis earlier, specifically our findings that the negative subjective well-being effects 
associated with inflows of foreign-born individuals are larger for the unemployed and those in 
relatively lower educational groupings, provide some support for our conjecture that perceived labour 
market threats may be a factor behind our results. This is because it seems reasonable to suggest that 
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these groups in particular are more likely to see themselves in direct labour market competition with 
migrants. In this section we look at the role that macro-economic conditions might play in moderating 
the adverse well-being effects from inflows of foreign-born individuals. Our a priori expectations are 
that in keeping with the idea of perceived labour market threats being a relevant factor, the estimated 
negative effect of foreign-born individuals will be relatively more pronounced when macro-economic 
conditions are less favourable. The intuition being that in times of economic stress (for example, 
negative or low GDP growth), natives may see net inflows of foreign-born individuals as more of a 
threat to their own economic security.  
 
As a means to examine this issue, we interacted GDP with foreign-born individuals. The resulting 
interaction coefficient (GDP*foreign-born individuals) was statistically significant, albeit at 10% 
significance level (0.0031, p = 0.092) and in Figure 1 we provide a visual illustration of this interaction 
effect. This Figure plots the relationship between foreign-born individuals and subjective well-being at 
the highest (3.7) and lowest (-4.3) GDP levels observed during our study period as well as a mid-point 
of sorts (0).14  Parallel lines would indicate that the effect of foreign-born individuals on subjective 
well-being is not responsive to changes in GDP.  We can see in this figure however, that the estimated 
negative impact of foreign-born individuals on well-being is close to 0 at high levels of GDP but we find 
that as growth gets lower, the estimated negative effect becomes more and more substantive. In 
other words, in times of economic stress the negative subjective well-being impact of immigration 
seems to be more apparent. 
Insert figure 1 here 
Social Identity theory 
Drawing on social identity theory, we offer up one further potential explanation as to why foreign-
born individuals negatively affects the subjective well-being of natives. The central hypothesis behind 
this theory is that in order to increase their own self-image, people will often boost the status of their 
own group (ingroup) and hold prejudiced views against the groups to which they ĚŽŶ ?ƚ ďĞůŽŶŐ
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(outgroup) (Tajfel, 1974).  In turn, inflows of foreign-born individuals may be seen as threatening the 
way of life and social identity of natives. Taking this argument one step further, we would expect to 
see that relative to the group we classified as natives in our earlier analysis (i.e. UK-born individuals), 
residents born outside the UK would be more likely to see migrants as part of their own ingroup as 
opposed to outgroup.  
 
Fortunately, our household surveys allows us to identify a sample of current residents living in local 
authority areas, but born outside the UK. Using this information, we then examined whether foreign-
born individuals has a differential impact on the well-being of these residents relative to the group we 
classified for simplicity as natives (UK-born). In keeping with social identity theory, we would expect 
that non-UK born residents would be less negatively impacted by immigration than UK-born ones 
(natives) as they are less likely to see migrants as part of an outgroup. Indeed we found that in contrast 
to the results we outlined earlier in relation to UK-born natives (Table 2), the subjective well-being of 
residents born outside the UK appears to be positively enhanced by inflows of migrants (0.055, p = 
0.06).  
 
Conclusion 
The main aim of this work was to ascertain if immigration in England was associated with any 
subjective well-being consequences for natives and, if so, to ascertain which groups were most likely 
to be impacted. While the labour market impacts of immigration have received substantial coverage 
in the literature, much less attention has been placed on broader measures of subjective well-
being.  When looking at the population as a whole, we find that inflows of foreign-born individuals 
into local areas is associated with modest negative impacts on the subjective well-being of UK-born 
natives. On the other hand, the subjective well-being of residents born outside the UK appears to be 
positively enhanced by inflows of migrants. An important feature of our analysis is that our findings 
are robust to two different estimators (panel models with individual-fixed effects and instrumental 
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variable approaches) and a series of robustness checks designed to address any remaining concerns 
surrounding, for example, residential sorting (selection bias). Notwithstanding this point, one 
potential limitation with this approach is that while we instrument our immigration figure with a 
predicted value which is estimated using prior settlement patterns, ideally one would exploit a natural 
experiment as an instrumental variable (e.g. a labour market shock which neatly identifies a treatment 
and a control group). Identifying such an instrumental variable will be challenging but a useful avenue 
for future work.  
 
A further important feature of our analysis is that we illustrate how ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐ ŽŶ  ?ĂǀĞƌĂŐĞ ? or put 
differently main effects will mask substantive differences across socioeconomic and 
sociodemographic groups when it comes to the impact of immigration on the subjective well-being of 
natives. Specifically, certain sub-groups such as the relatively elderly, the unemployed and more 
broadly the less well-off appear much more likely to experience a reduction in subjective well-being 
in response to inflows of migrants than others. It is notable that there is a significant degree of 
similarity between these well-being differentials across distinct cohorts of the population, and voting 
patterns (for example, see Ipsos 2016) observed in the recent UK referendum on EU membership 
(commonly referred to as Brexit). In light of this, one useful avenue for future work would be to unpick 
to what extent voting patterns evident in the recent UK referendum and indeed other referendums 
can be attributable to well-being differentials across socioeconomic and sociodemographic groups. 
 
An additional novel feature of our work is that we point to two potential channels, namely perceived 
labour market competition and social identity that can aid our understanding of how immigration may 
influence the subjective well-being of natives. Regarding perceived labour market competition, our 
argument rests on the idea that while objective evidence would point to negligible, if any, negative 
impacts on employment outcomes for natives in the UK (and evidence would point to positive effects 
for the wage distribution as a whole), public perception may differ. Indeed a cursory examination of 
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the popular press in the UK would suggest that, for large sections of the public at least, immigration is 
often associated with negative effects on the employment opportunities for natives. This, we suggest, 
could lead to certain cohorts viewing rising net inflows of foreign-born individuals as an economic 
threat. In support of this premise, we find that the negative relationship between net inflows of 
foreign-born individuals and well-being is more pronounced when macro-economic conditions are less 
favourable. The intuition being that in times of economic stress (for example, negative or low GDP 
growth), perceived economic threats will be more apparent to natives.  
 
In further support of this point related to the potential for perceived labour market impacts to be a 
factor, it is perhaps worth highlighting some interesting recent work published in this journal which 
ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚĚƵĞƚŽǁŚĂƚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĂƐ ?ĞƚŚŶŝĐƉĞŶĂůƚŝĞƐ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞŵĂǇďĞĂƉƌĞǀĂůĞŶĐĞŽĨ
over-qualification when it comes to the presence of migrants from the A8 accession countries in the 
workforce (Sirkeci et al., 2018). Additionally, at least in the short run, there is evidence that A8 migrant 
workers record substantially lower absence rates than native workers (Dawson et al., 2018). All this 
may help fuel a perception on the part of natives that migrants are an economic threat (regardless of 
whether this is actually true in practice or not).    
 
We draw on social identity theory as a further proposed explanation for the observed adverse well-
being impact from immigration. Social identity theory suggests that ethnic groups can form the basis 
for self-categorization and emotional attachment, and thus foster psychological well-being (e.g. 
Phinney et al., 2001). Here we argue that immigration may serve to dilute the ethnic characteristics of 
the native ingroup as migrants may be seen as an outgroup by natives and thus looked on less 
favourably. Thus, for natives with a relatively strong sense of national identity, increased immigration 
may be seen as a cultural threat, as opposed to merely an economic one. 
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To conclude, our findings suggest that inflows of foreign-born individuals into local areas in England 
negatively affects the well-being of UK-born natives, but that these effects differ sharply across socio-
demographic groupings. Even if objective evidence would suggest that rising levels of immigration 
does not negatively affect the economic outcomes of natives, if immigration is associated with adverse 
effects on the subjective well-being of certain groups in society, then this makes the challenge of 
integration between natives and migrants more difficult. In such circumstances, it becomes important 
not just to determine which groups are adversely affected by immigration, but also what can explain 
these effects. In this study, we point to two potential mechanisms that warrants further investigation 
when it comes to understanding the dynamics between immigration and subjective well-being, 
namely perceived labour market competition and social identity.  
1 The A8 countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) plus Malta 
and Cyprus were allowed access to the UK from 2004. 
2 We note that there is some research to suggest that inflows of migrants may have negative effects on the 
wages of relatively low-skilled workers (see Borjas, 2003) 
3 They are 9 regions in England (12 in the UK as a whole) and they define areas (constituencies) for the 
purposes of elections to the European Parliament. 
4 Interviews from each wave span over two and in some cases three years 
5 Findings are robust to clustering at the local authority level 
6 We focus on England as opposed to the UK as one of our key control variables  W Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation  W are only available for Local Authority Districts in England. The sample excludes people aged 18 or 
less. 
7 In order to assess whether the difference of coefficients from separate regressions is statistically different we 
employ the standard z statistics ܼ ൌ ሺܾଵ െ ܾଶሻ ඥሺܵܧܾଵሻଶ െ ሺܵܧܾଶሻଶ ? ǡwhich is valid in large samples (Clogg et
al., 1995 but see also Gelman and Stern, 2006). 
8 We selected 60 or under as the reference category but we observe similar findings (i.e., no significant effects) 
if we select younger age cohorts too. 
9 The difference of the estimated effects of foreign-born individuals between individuals in the lowest income 
quartile is statistically different from individuals with above median income (at 5% level).   
10 The difference between both coefficients is statistically significant at 5% level. 
11 The first stage regression estimate of our predicted migrants variable is 0.85 (p < 0.001). The F-stat is 40692. 
12 Results do not change in any meaningful fashion if we for example look at the 2009-2007 or 2011-2017 
period. 
13 To aid interpretation we multiplied this ratio by 100 so that the coefficients capture the estimated impact of 
a 1% increase in the migrant share. 
14 The same picture emerges if we select different levels of GDP as our benchmark levels 
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Figure 1: The extent to which the effect of foreign-born individuals varies according to changes in GDP
 
Note: Foreign-ďŽƌŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂƌĞŝŶ ? ? ? ?Ɛ
Source: Figure created in Stata (a statistical software package) by the authors outlining the 
interaction effect between foreign-born individuals and GDP.   
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Table 1: The relationship between subjective well-being (GHQ) and foreign-born individuals 
 Pooled OLS Fixed-effects IV 
    
Foreign-born individuals 0.003 -0.025* -0.032** 
(00,000s) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) 
    
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Index of Deprivation Yes Yes Yes 
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes 
GDP Yes Yes Yes 
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes 
    
    
Observations 214,610 214,610 214,610 
Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of individual subjective well-being (GHQ) on number of 
foreign-born individuals within the local authority of residence. Each regression controls for individual 
characteristics (age, age-squared, educational attainment dummies, gender, gross household income, marital 
status, number of children, labour force status dummies), the local authority deprivation rank, annual GDP 
growth at national level, wave and regional dummies. The second column labelled Fixed-effects include 
individual fixed-effects. The third column reports estimates of a regression in which the variable foreign-born 
individuals has been instrumented using a variable derived based on an analysis of past settlement patterns by 
migrants. The full set of estimates can be found in Table A5 in the appendix. Standard errors in parenthesis are 
clustered at the individual level.  * statistically significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant 
at 1% level. 
 
 
  
27 
Table 2: The relationship between subjective well-being (GHQ) and foreign-born individuals and the 
relationship between subjective well-being (GHQ) and migrant share  ? analysis of differences across 
sub-groups 
Foreign-born individuals Migrant share 
Fixed-effects IV IV 
Coef. Clustered 
Std. Err. 
Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err 
Age 
Age<=60 -0.009 0.014 -0.011 0.015 -0.008 0.011 
Age > 60 -0.084*** 0.031 -0.116*** 0.035 -0.071*** 0.022 
Age > 70 -0.142*** 0.045 -0.183*** 0.052 -0.128*** 0.036 
Household income (quartiles) 
Lowest 25% -0.062** 0.032 -0.100*** 0.034 -0.079*** 0.027 
Lowest 50% -0.038* 0.021 -0.069*** 0.022 -0.052*** 0.017 
Highest 50% -0.016 0.019 -0.009 0.019 -0.006 0.013 
Highest 25% -0.016 0.026 0.001 0.028 0.001 0.018 
Education 
Degree Education -0.007 0.018 -0.008 0.020 -0.006 0.014 
Secondary Education 0.001 0.022 -0.024 0.022 -0.016 0.015 
Other Education -0.056 0.050 -0.043 0.057 -0.034 0.044 
No formal qualifications -0.138*** 0.042 -0.137*** 0.046 -0.113*** 0.039 
Gender 
Males -0.018 0.018 -0.031* 0.018 -0.021* 0.012 
Females -0.031 0.019 -0.031* 0.019 0.023* 0.014 
Labour market status 
Unemployed -0.146* 0.080 -0.214* 0.114 -0.225* 0.120 
Employed -0.010 0.017 -0.011 0.017 -0.008 0.012 
Natives v non-UK born 
Non-UK born 0.055* 0.029 0.058* 0.030 0.038* 0.020 
Natives -0.025* 0.013 -0.032** 0.013 -0.022** 0.009 
Notes: Each cell reports coefficients or standard errors of foreign-born individuals from separate subjective well-
being (GHQ) regressions on specific sub-groups. Each regression controls for individual characteristics (age, age-
squared, educational attainment dummies, gender, gross household income, marital status, number of children, 
labour force status dummies), the local authority deprivation rank, annual GDP growth at national level, wave 
and region dummies. IV refers to an instrumental variable specification in which the variable foreign-born 
individuals has been instrumented using a variable derived based on an analysis of past settlement patterns by 
migrants. *statistically significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level
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Online Appendix 
 Table A1: GHQ components  
Lost much sleep over worry? 
Felt constantly under strain? 
Felt that you could not overcome your difficulties? 
Been feeling unhappy and depressed? 
Been able to concentrate on whatever you are doing? 
Felt that you were playing a useful part in things? 
Felt capable of making decisions about things? 
ĞĞŶĂďůĞƚŽĞŶũŽǇǇŽƵƌŶŽƌŵĂůĚĂǇ ?ƚŽ ?ĚĂǇĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ? 
Been able to face up to your problems? 
Been feeling reasonably happy, all things considered? 
Been ůŽƐŝŶŐƐĞůĨ ?ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨ ?
Been thinking of yourself as a worthless person? 
 
 
Figure A1: Total number of foreign-born individuals in UK and England over 2000  ? 2017 (00,000s) 
 
Source: Data came from the Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2018) 
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A2 Indices of Multiple Deprivation 
We merged our household survey datasets with the English Indices of Multiple Deprivation provided 
by the Department for Communities and Local Government.1 These Indices of Multiple 
Deprivation rank each neighbourhood in England according to seven distinct measures of deprivation. 
The specific deprivation rankings include Income; Employment; Health and Disability; Education, Skills 
and Training; Crime; Barriers to Housing and Services; and Living Environment. In addition to these 
specific rankings, the Department for Communities and Local Government publish an amalgamated 
measure reflecting the overall level of deprivation in each neighbourhood. We include this 
amalgamated deprivation ranking as an additional covariate in order to control for any differences in 
the economic and social conditions across local authority areas.2 These indices are published at regular 
intervals, i.e., 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2015.3 We extrapolated and interpolated across these intervals 
to obtain a measure of neighbourhood deprivation for each year of our analysis and added the 
resulting deprivation measure as a control variable.  
1 See DCLG (2015) for more details. 
2 Results are robust to different combinations of these neighbourhood level control variables 
3 The indices are published in 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2015. However they typically capture information from 
neighbourhoods in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013. In addition to a relative ranking across neighbourhoods the DCLG 
also publish scores for each neighbourhood but these scores in contrast to the ranks are not directly comparable 
over time, and so are not used in the analysis. 
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Table A3: Summary statistics of the sample used in main models in table 1 (N=214,610) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Subjective well-being 24.87 5.45 0 36 
Foreign-born individuals 28064 38854 1000 268000 
Age 48.79 17.55 19 102 
Age squared 2688.17 1804.19 361 10404 
Other degree 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Degree 0.22 0.41 0 1 
A-levels 0.21 0.41 0 1 
GCSE 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Other 0.10 0.31 0 1 
No formal qualifications 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Male 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Household income 3530.05 2780.37 -20000 86703.29 
Single 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Married 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Divorced 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Widowed 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Number of children 0.53 0.93 0 9 
Self-employed 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Paid employment 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Unemployed 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Inactive 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Local-authority deprivation rank 17120.98 9164.41 1 32842 
National GDP 1.74 1.68 -4.3 3.7 
North West Region 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Yorkshire 0.11 0.31 0 1 
East Midlands 0.10 0.30 0 1 
West Midlands 0.11 0.31 0 1 
East of England 0.11 0.31 0 1 
London 0.10 0.29 0 1 
South East England 0.17 0.37 0 1 
South West England 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Notes: Subjective well-being (GHQ) and individual characteristics are from BHPS and UKHLS (2000  W 2017). The 
number of foreign-born individuals at local authority level over 2000  W 2017 is from the ONS. 
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A4 Derivation of Instrument variables 
We relied on an instrumental variable strategy based on past settlement patterns first developed by 
Card and DiNardo (2000) and Card (2001) and subsequently widely used in the immigration literature. 
For instance, focusing specifically on the UK context, Bell et al. (2013), Sa (2011), Braakman (2019) and 
Giuntella et al. (2016) have recently employed this instrumental variable approach to examine the 
impact of immigration on crime, house prices and work injury respectively. The central idea behind 
this instrument is that irrespective of the economic characteristics of neighbourhoods, migrants will 
be more likely to locate in certain areas over others based on the prior settlement patterns of past 
migrants. We can therefore exploit the settlement patterns evident from a past Census to generate 
ĂŶĞǆŽŐĞŶŽƵƐƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚ 威?ŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ 嬀 ǀĂůƵĞƚŚĂƚĐĂŶƐĞƌǀĞĂƐĂŶŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĐƵƌƌĞŶƚŝŶĨůŽǁƐ ?
To implement this approach in our study, first we obtained data relating to the concentration of 
migrants in each local authority area from the 2001 and 2011 Censuses. Next we use this information 
ƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶƚŚĞ 威?ƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚ 嬀 ŶƵŵďĞƌƐŽƌƐŚĂƌĞŽĨĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ-born individuals in each local authority area to
use as an instrument for the actual number or share of foreign-born individuals. The predicted number 
or share of migrants in each local authority area is simply obtained by redistributing the total numbers 
or share of migrants across local authority areas, based on prior settlement patterns, i.e., the migrant 
share evident from the 2001 and 2011 censuses respectively.4  
To illustrate how we obtained the predicted number or share in practice, consider a local authority 
that had 1% of all foreign-born individuals according to the 2001 census and 2% according to the 2011 
census. In the years between 2001 and 2011, the local authority would be allocated 1% of all new 
ĂƌƌŝǀĂůƐĂŶĚƉŽƐƚ ƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚďĞĂůůŽĐĂƚĞĚ ?A㤃堀 dŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚƚŚĞŶƐĞƌǀĞĂƐŽƵƌ 威褁?ĞĚŝĐƚĞĚ 嬀 ǀĂůƵĞ 堀 /Ŷ
short, we are exploiting exogenous variation generated by prior settlement patterns of migrants. We 
also derived an additional predicted number of migrants figure by just using the 20015 census figures 
which we employ as an additional sensitivity check.  
A potential threat to thĞǀĂůŝĚŝƚǇŽĨƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞ 威?ƌĞĚŝĐƚĞĚ 嬀 ǀĂůƵĞƐĂƐĂŶŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůǀĂƌŝĂďůĞŝƐŝĨůŽĐĂů
economic shocks which initially attracted migrants persist over time as these may be correlated with 
individual well-being. This potential problem is substantially mitigated in our analysis by including 
fixed-effects as well as wave dummies (which will account for any trends) a measure of national GDP, 
region dummies and time-varying local controls such as neighbourhood deprivation 
4 For years pre 2011 we redistribute the total number of migrants based on the 2001 census figures (we use 
actual ONS values for 2000 and actual census values for 2001). For years post 2011 we redistribute based on the 
figures obtained from the 2011 census (and use actual census values for 2011). Results do not change if we drop 
observations from 2000 and 2001 from the analysis. 
5 Unfortunately it is not possible to use earlier census figures as boundaries have changed. 
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Table A5: The relationship between subjective well-being (GHQ) and foreign-born individuals - full 
estimates of the analysis presented in table 1 
 Pooled OLS Fixed-effects IV 
    
Foreign-born individuals (00,000) 0.003 -0.025* -0.032** 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.013) 
Age -0.150*** -0.145*** -0.144*** 
 (0.005) (0.050) (0.043) 
Age-squared 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Other higher degree 0.454*** 0.104 0.104 
 (0.050) (0.325) (0.242) 
Degree 0.488*** -0.163 -0.162 
 (0.047) (0.320) (0.231) 
Higher secondary qualification (A-level) 0.473*** 0.246 0.247 
 (0.046) (0.300) (0.213) 
Lower secondary qualification (GCSE) 0.466*** 0.192 0.192 
 (0.044) (0.284) (0.203) 
Other 0.331*** -0.170 -0.169 
 (0.050) (0.239) (0.179) 
Male 0.944***   
 (0.024)   
Household income (£0,000) 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.263*** 0.203** 0.203*** 
 (0.040) (0.088) (0.069) 
Divorced -0.885*** -0.396*** -0.396*** 
 (0.061) (0.132) (0.098) 
Widowed -0.598*** -0.854*** -0.853*** 
 (0.066) (0.167) (0.126) 
Number of children -0.020 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.024) 
Self-employed 0.106*** 0.087 0.087 
 (0.040) (0.068) (0.061) 
Unemployed -2.479*** -1.677*** -1.677*** 
 (0.076) (0.089) (0.064) 
Inactive -1.343*** -0.528*** -0.529*** 
 (0.036) (0.061) 0.087 
Local authority deprivation rank 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
National GDP 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
Wave dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 214,610 214,610 214,610 
Notes: This table report full set of estimates from regressions of individual subjective well-being (GHQ) on 
number of foreign-born individuals. Each regression controls for wave and regional dummies that are not 
reported. *, **, and ***, denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Clustered standard 
errors, adjusted for clustering at individual level, are reported in parenthesis 
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A6: Selection bias 
Notwithstanding the longitudinal nature of our analysis it is still perhaps instructive to discuss the 
potential for selection bias due to residential sorting on the part of natives or migrants to affect our 
estimates. When it comes to migrants, one could reasonably conjecture that settlement patterns of 
migrants and the subjective well-being of natives could both be partly driven by the overall prosperity 
of an area. Our main specification should mitigate against this possibility in that the effect of inflows 
of foreign-born individuals on subjective well-being is identified only when it changes for the same 
individual, and after controlling for a rich-set of time-varying factors at both the individual and at the 
neighbourhood level (e.g. English indices of deprivation are added as controls to our specification).   
A further possibility is if natives who are relatively more adversely affected by inflows of foreign-born 
individuals move to a residential area with less migrants, then this would undermine our ability to 
precisely estimate the effect of foreign-born individuals. As a means to gauge the likely importance of 
this factor, we can look at what factors are related with the probability of individuals moving in our 
sample. To facilitate this, using a special licence application we obtained the specific neighbourhood 
each individual in our sample resides in6 at each interview date. We then derived a simple binary 
indicator which captures whether individuals have switched neighbourhoods between waves. We 
identified 16,918 individual-wave observations and examined what factors are related with the 
probability of individuals changing their neighbourhood between waves using both a pooled cross-
sectional logit as well as a fixed-effects panel logit model. We did not find any significant relationship 
between net inflows of foreign-born individuals and the probability of observing neighbourhood 
changes in our sample. The coefficient estimate was close to zero and not close to being statistically 
significant in either our fixed effects or pooled logit model7. This is in keeping with the literature 
underpinning residential mobility which suggests that factors such as age, life cycle stage and 
employment opportunities are the major factors underpinning residential moves.  
In order to further strengthen the causal interpretation of our results, we conducted two further 
robustness checks which seek to mitigate any bias due to residential self-selection. The first is that we 
repeated the analysis in Table 1 but added an additional covariate representing those individuals who 
have moved neighbourhoods during our study period. The second robustness check is that we simply 
6 Neighbourhoods here are defined at the lower super output area. These are at a very spatially refined scale 
as there is an average of just 1500 respondents in each lower super output area and over 32,000 of these in 
the UK. 
7 Coefficient estimate from our pooled logit (0.002, p = 0.452) and from our panel (0.005, p = 0.470).  
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excluded all individuals who have moved neighbourhoods from our analysis. The coefficient estimates 
are very stable under both scenarios8. 
8 When adding an additional dummy variable for movers, the coefficient for foreign-born individuals is -0.027 
(p = 0.036). When excluding movers (8% of the sample) the coefficient estimate is again very similar (-0.023, p 
= 0.17). This compares to an estimate of -0.025 (p = 0.054) in table 1. 
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Table A7: The relationship between subjective well-being (GHQ) and foreign-born individuals and the 
relationship between subjective well-being (GHQ) and migrant share  ? analysis of differences across 
sub-groups: Comparison of IV based on 2001/2011 Censuses vs. IV based on only 2001 Census 
 
 Foreign-born individuals Migrant share 
 IV 2001/2011 IV 2001 IV 2001/2011 IV 2001 
 Coef. Clustered  
Std. Err. 
Coef. Std. 
Err  
Coef. Std. 
Err 
Coef. Std. Err 
 Age 
Age<=60 -0.011 0.015 -0.006 0.018 -0.008 0.011 -0.005 0.014 
Age > 60 -0.116*** 0.035 -0.064 0.043 -0.071*** 0.022 -0.046 0.032 
Age > 70 -0.183*** 0.052 -0.123* 0.066 -0.128*** 0.036 -0.097* 0.053 
Household income (quartiles) 
Lowest 25% -0.100*** 0.034 -0.051 0.042 -0.079*** 0.027 -0.045 0.037 
Lowest 50% -0.069*** 0.022 -0.060** 0.027 -0.052*** 0.017 -0.051** 0.023 
Highest 50% -0.009 0.019 -0.002 0.023 -0.006 0.013 -0.001 0.017 
Highest 25% 0.001 0.028 -0.014 0.034 0.001 0.018 -0.010 0.025 
Education 
Degree 
Education 
-0.008 0.020 0.002 0.023 -0.006 0.014 0.002 0.019 
Secondary 
Education 
-0.024 0.022 -0.025 0.027 -0.016 0.015 -0.018 0.020 
Other 
Education 
-0.043 0.057 -0.006 0.068 -0.034 0.044 -0.006 0.063 
No formal 
qualifications 
-0.137*** 0.046 -0.112* 0.057 -0.113*** 0.039 -0.107* 0.055 
Gender 
Males -0.031* 0.018 -0.029 0.022 -0.021* 0.012 -0.022 0.016 
Females -0.031* 0.019 -0.017 0.022 0.023* 0.014 -0.014 0.018 
Labour market status 
Unemployed -0.214* 0.114 -0.146 0.131 -0.225* 0.120 -0.178 0.161 
Employed -0.011 0.017 -0.010 0.021 -0.008 0.012 -0.008 0.016 
Natives v non-UK born 
Non-UK born 0.058* 0.030 0.080** 0.035 0.038* 0.020 0.062** 0.028 
Natives -0.032** 0.013 -0.027** 0.013 -0.022** 0.009 -0.021** 0.010 
Notes: Each cell reports coefficients or standard errors of foreign-born individuals from separate subjective well-
being (GHQ) regressions on specific sub-groups. Each regression controls for individual characteristics (age, age-
squared, educational attainment dummies, gender, gross household income, marital status dummies, number 
of children, labour force status dummies), the local authority deprivation rank, annual GDP growth at national 
level, wave and region dummies. *statistically significant at 10% level, **significant at 5% level, *** significant 
at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
